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Competition Law's Role in Health
Care Quality
John V. Jacobi,J.D.*
When dangerous medical practices threaten patients' lives,
Americans expect government to act. This expectation survives
evolving attitudes regarding the proper balance of government,
professional and market control of health care delivery. Over
the past 30 years, regulatory philosophy has vacillated between
direct "command and control" regulation and the maintenance
of efficient markets. We may not regulate less, but we regulate
differently.
Regulatory innovation is not, however, smooth or gradual.
Government often acts in response to dramatic events, whether
natural or man-made. Government reacts to terrorist attacks,
hurricanes, oil spills and floods. Theoretical preferences for big
or small government diminish in salience in the face of a sufficiently substantial threat to public safety. The 1999 report of the
Institute of Medicine ("IOM") on medical error1 reported findings that had hallmarks of a disaster demanding government action. The IOM, extrapolating from two large studies, estimated
that 44,000 to 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of
medical errors.2 As the IOM pointed out, this mortality rate
places medical error ahead of motor vehicle accidents, breast
cancer, and AIDS as a cause of death.3 The scale of this problem has elicited attention and response from Congress and
commentators.
The flurry of activity in response to the IOM report is not
unprecedented. Following years of documented poor-quality
care in nursing homes, Congress commissioned a study into the
* Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Health Law & Policy Program,
Seton Hall University School of Law. This paper benefitted from the discussion of
the participants in The Role of Law in Quality Health Care, the First Annual Health
Law and Policy Colloquium at Loyola University School of Law. Thanks in addition
to Jemi Goulian and Shannon Chilinski for their research assistance.
1.
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, COMM. ON QUALITY CARE IN AMERICA, To ERR IS
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (1999) [hereinafter "To ERR IS
HUMAN"].

.2.
3.

Id. at1.
Id.
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issue by the 1M. 4 The resulting report, published in 1986, described a wide range of quality problems in the industry, and
suggested a range of regulatory responses.5 Many of these recommendations were translated into law and regulation. 6 Similarly, an increasing drumbeat of discontent with perceived
quality concerns in the managed care industry during the 1990s
led to the consideration and passage of a wide variety of laws,
loosely referred to as "patient protection acts," regulating managed care organizations. The governmental reaction to these
two examples of health care quality concerns differed sharply,
reflecting preferences for varying mixes of market-enhancing
and non-market solutions, depending upon the circumstances.
This essay will first briefly review various modes of regulation
of health quality.8 It will then discuss the concerns raised by the
IOM's 1986 nursing home study and the current controversy
over managed care quality, and the regulatory responses to
both. 9 It will then discuss the recent IOM report on medical
error, and the range of available regulatory responses. 10 It concludes by arguing for a regulatory response to the problem of
medical error that relies to only a limited extent on command
and control regulation. Instead, it argues that the significant
causes of medical error are complex and not readily amenable
to direct correction. Regulatory oversight to ensure professional development and adoption of remedial action, and to per4.

INSTITUTE

HOMES 2-4
HOMES"].

OF MEDICINE,

(1986) [hereinafter

IMPROVING
"IMPROVING

THE

QUALITY

THE QUALITY

OF CARE

IN NURSING

OF CARE IN NURSING

5. See id.
6. See Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987, enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, P.L. 100-203, §§ 4201, 4212, 101 Stat. 1330, §§ 174, 207
(1987); 57 Fed. Reg. 4516 (Omnibus Nursing Home Requirements); 54 Fed. Reg. 5316
(Requirements for Long Term Care Facilities). See generally INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE (2001) [hereinafter "IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE"]; Elizabeth K. Schneider, Long-Term
Care Regulatory Reform: HCFA, The IOM and Opportunity Lost, 4 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L. J. 107 (2000).
7. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Understandingthe Managed Care Backlash 17:4
HEALTH AFFAIRS 80 (July/August 1998); Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "PatientProtection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and
Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1999); David A. Hyman, Regulating Managed
Care: What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221 (2000);
Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash - Righteous or Reactionary?, 335 N. ENG.
J. MED. 1601 (1996). See also S. 1053, 107th Cong., § 402 (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th
Cong., § 402 (2001) (proposed patient protection acts).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
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mit effective marketplace incorporation of quality information is
appropriate. Pragmatic assessment of failures of professionalism and markets should drive limited but attentive governmental intervention to protect the welfare of patients at risk.
I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEALTH QUALITY
AND REGULATION

Defining health care quality such that the good can be distinguished objectively from the bad is difficult. The task requires a
melding of the scientific, the customary, and the normative to
permit an evaluation against both technical standards and the
achievement of social goals.11 Avedis Donabedian described the
task of judging health quality as requiring an assessment of "the
application of medical science and technology in a manner that
maximizes its benefits to health without correspondingly increasing its risks. ' 12 But technical competence is merely instrumental, and has value only when serving "socially defined values
' 13
and norms.
A working definition of quality is necessary in order to evaluate and improve health care. The definition employed by the
IOM describes quality as "the degree to which health services
for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge." 14 This short definition does not avoid the
complexity of the concept. Quality assessment includes the normative (i.e., "desired health outcomes), the objective (i.e., measuring "outcomes") and the customary (i.e., "consistent with
15
professional knowledge").
In institutional settings, these principles are often translated
into assessment of structure, process and outcomes of health
care delivery. 16 Assessment of structure considers the resources
- human and otherwise - available for care; assessment of pro11. See AVEDIS DONABEDIAN,
TO ITS ASSESSMENT 4-6 (1980).
12.

THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES

Id. at 5.

13. Id. See also John V. Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers Through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 KANS. L. REV. 705, 766-70 (1997).

14. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE (K. Lohr, ed. 1990). See also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 244 (2001) [hereinafter
"CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM")] (quoting the 1990 IOM study).
15.

Maria A. Friedman, Issues in Measuring and Improving Health Care Quality,

HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Summer 1995, at 1.
16. DONABEDIAN, supra note 11, at 79-85.
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cess considers the routine means by which the resources are applied; assessment of outcomes considers the results of care,
against some objective metric.17 In physician services, the assessment of quality is closely dependent on observing deviance
from a customary norm. Once the application of normative
principles permits a determination as to the appropriatenessof a
procedure, s performance quality is usually determined in comparison with professional standards of care. These professional
standards may be derived informally, through observation of a
sufficiently large cohort of practitioners, or more formally, by
reference to norms produced by professional organizations. 19
The informal development of many important norms thus renunavoidably imprecise
ders quality assessment in health care
20
and subject to varying interpretations.
The technical, even arcane, analysis of health quality is extremely important. Consumers care a great deal about the quality of health care, but without some technical assistance, they
cannot meaningfully evaluate the quality of care. For minor gradations of quality, the marketplace may well be the best vehicle
for the provision of such technical assistance. But major deviations from acceptable quality norms threaten the health and
safety of consumers, and therefore more readily support the
need for regulatory intervention. Such major deviations arise,
for example, when people in nursing homes suffer unnecessary
pressure ulcers 2 or when people with apparently comprehensive health coverage are denied access to undeniably appropriate care. 2 The IOM's report that 44,000 to 98,000 Americans
die from preventable2 3 medical error each year is such a major
deviation. The health care delivery system ought not function so
as to subject people to serious avoidable injury. Under such cir17. Id.; See also Maria A. Friedman, supra note 15, at 6.
18. CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM supra note 14, at 244-45.
19. Id. at 245.
20. See John V. Jacobi, supra note 13, at 767; Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Oversight of
the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management or Market?, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.
REV. 825, 843-44 (1995).
21. See IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE, supra note 6, at 80-82.
22. See John E. Ware et al., Differences in 4-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly and
Poor, Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Service Systems, 276 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 1039, 1042 (1996).
23. I do not mean to glide over the point that, as the IOM pointed out, "to err is
human." To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1. Mistakes occur in every human endeavor.
In this context I mean "preventable" as does the IOM - subject to possible correction through system modifications. Id. at 28.
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cumstances, quality assessment and regulation properly have
been grist for the government mill.
The means by which government regulates health care has
shifted over time and has varied among the health care settings
to which regulation is applied. At an ideological level, commentators advocate for means that range from comprehensive governmental control of health care delivery to free market
principles governing health transactions. Scholarly and political
thinking has shifted several times in past decades, and a range of
strong regulatory positions are well represented in the discourse. 24 As is often the case, most discussion tends toward a
mixed view between the two extremes; the question is not
whether, but how much government will regulate health care
delivery.
Toward one end of the regulatory spectrum, governmental
judgment replaces that of the industry with regulators making
direct instrumental decisions about how care should be delivered. This "command and control" regulation springs from the
position that market forces cannot assure safety, and that governmental judgment should therefore supplant private judgment. Toward the opposite end of the spectrum, government
operates under different assumptions. In regulating to enhance
competition, the government regards aspects of the health care
system as properly driven by market forces, but sees imperfections in the market sufficient to justify some governmental interference. Examples of the former are licensure and certification
requirements requiring staffing levels and modes of treatment.
Examples of the latter are regulations facilitating the gathering
and distribution of information, antitrust regulations protecting
consumers from anti-competitive arrangements, anti-fraud regulations protecting market participants from devious conduct impeding comparative evaluation, and regulations creating
opportunities for the fair and open resolution of disputes.

24.

See TROYEN A.

BRENNEN

&

DONALD

M.

BERWICK, NEW RULES: REGULA-

11-14 (1996).
25. See id. at 23; THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED 1-3
(1998); PHILIP JACOBS, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 339-55 (4'
Ed. 1997); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 825 (1995); CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTIONS, MARKETS AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE

TER THE RIGHTS

REVOLUTION:

RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY

STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
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NURSING HOMES AND MANAGED CARE: PRIOR
REGULATORY RESPONSES

On two recent occasions, one in the 1980s and one in the
1990s, substantial concern surfaced regarding the quality of
nursing home care. Concerns arose in the 1980s about the quality of care provided in the Nation's nursing homes, and a study
by the IOM addressed this concern at length. Comprehensive
statutory and regulatory measures consistent with the IOM
study have been produced steadily since the release of its study.
Later, in the 1990s, concerns about the practices of managed
care organizations ("MCOs") resulted in a somewhat less systematic review of the health quality implications. A range of
statutory and regulatory responses followed, and major federal
statutory intervention also may be in the offing. This section
will examine the nature of the quality concerns in the above two
instances and the shape of the regulatory response that
followed.
A.

Nursing Home Quality

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the quality of care provided
in nursing homes was questioned in a series of Congressional
hearings.26 Some impetus for these hearings was provided by
Colorado litigation on behalf of nursing home residents who
challenged the lack of federal oversight in the arena of long
term care.27 After recounting the recent explosion in need for
long-term care services,28 the trial court noted that:
The evidentiary record.., supports a general finding that all is
not well in the nation's nursing homes and that the enormous
expenditures of public funds and the earnest efforts of public
officials and public employees have not produced an
equivalent return in benefits. That failure of expectations has
produced frustration and anger among those who are aware of
the realities of life in some nursing homes which provide so
little service that they could be characterized as orphanages
for the aged.29
26. See Schneider, supra note 6, at 109 (citing reports from Congressional
hearings).
27.

Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583 (loth Cir. 1984). See Schneider, supra note 6 at

109-11 (discussing place of Smith v. Heckler in the push for greater oversight of nursing homes).
28. Smith v. Heckler, 557 F. Supp. 289, 292 (D. Colo. 1983) reversed 747 F.2d 583
(10th Cir. 1984).
29. Id. at 293.
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In the Colorado litigation, plaintiffs argued that the poor
quality of care provided in many nursing homes was in part
traceable to a failure of federal oversight. 30 As a dominant
funder of nursing homes through the Medicaid program, the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") exercises
substantial power over nursing homes through its quality regulations.3 ' Plaintiffs argued that the means by which HHS enforced
these regulations violated the Medicaid Act 32 by focusing on the
"theoretical capability of the facility to provide high quality care
rather than ... the care actually provided. '33 The court found
that plaintiffs had established both that the Medicaid Act requires HHS to police nursing homes to assure that quality services are provided, and that the failure of HHS to "promulgate
regulations which will enable [it] to be informed as to whether
the nursing facilities receiving federal Medicaid funds are actually providing high quality medical care" violated a statutory
duty. Consequently, the court permitted the remedy of
mandamus.34
As this judicial evaluation of nursing home oversight proceeded, HHS proposed regulations easing the annual inspection
and certification requirements for nursing homes participating
in Medicaid.35 The regulations were "strongly opposed" by state
nursing home regulators and consumer groups because they
seemed a move in the wrong direction, lessening regulatory
oversight at a time when long term care services were judged as
deficient, and the regulatory system was judged as too lax.36
Under pressure from Congress, HHS requested a review of
nursing home regulation by the 10M, which released its report
in 1986. 37 The report reached three essential conclusions. First,
it concluded that applying "reasonably objective measures" of
quality to nursing homes established that care was frequently
"seriously inadequate. '' 38 Second, it concluded that quality can
30. Id. at 290.
31. 747 F.2d at 587 (describing the regulatory requirements regarding, e.g., "the
frequency and general content of patients' attending physician evaluations," nursing
requirements and personal care requirements).
32. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq.
33. 747 F.2d at 587.
34. Id. at 591.
35. See IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES, supra note 4, at
1.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 21.
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be improved through strengthened regulatory oversight, particularly on the part of the federal government. 39 And third, it
found that regulatory reform alone would not correct the quality
problems that existed in nursing homes. Instead, improvements
in the management and training of staff and effective community and consumer involvement were also required to remedy
the deficits.4 °
Congress responded to the IOM report with the passage of
the Nursing Home Act of 1987.41 The Act and regulations
promulgated between 1989 and 1991 addressed such fundamental quality issues as patient assessment and care plans, minimum
facility staffing, patient privacy, decisional and visitation rights,
and patient evaluation and screening requirements.4 2 Subsequent regulations established the survey and certification mechanisms by which a nursing homes' compliance with substantive
obligations may be measured, and set out the remedial tools
available to regulators, including directing plans of correction,
imposing training requirements, placing a state monitor in the
facility, imposing civil money penalties, and terminating participation in Medicaid.43
The regulation of nursing homes that followed the 1986 IOM
report is best described as "command and control" regulation.
The regulations avowedly intrude into the daily activities of
nursing homes, prescribing in detail the conduct of care providers, thereby substituting the judgment of regulatory officials for
those of treatment professionals in many aspects of care. These
regulations are consistent with the IOM's 1986 findings which
rejected free market mechanisms of quality assurance. 4 The
IOM's advocacy of command and control regulation over a market-oriented approach followed naturally from its assessment of
the ability of nursing home residents to protect themselves
through free market methods:
39. Id. at 21-22.
40. Id. at 24.
41. See IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE, supra note 6, at 21; Marshall B. Kapp, Quality of Care and Quality of Life in Nursing Facilities:What's Regulation Got To Do With It?, 31 McGEORGE L. REV. 707, 711-12 (2000); Schneider, supra
note 6, at 107.
42. See Kapp, supra note 41, at 712.
43. See IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE, supra note 6, at 153-56;
Kapp, supra note 41, at 712-13.
44. See IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES, supra note 4, at
21-22.
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Persons needing nursing home care generally suffer from a
large array of physical, functional, and mental disabilities. A
significant portion of all residents are mentally impaired. The
average resident's ability to choose rationally among providers
and to switch from one provider to another is therefore very
limited even if bed occupancy rates are low enough to make
such choices feasible .... Moreover, some who reside in nurs-

ing homes lack close family to act as their advocates. Even if
they have family the choice of a nursing home is usually made
relatively hastily in response to a new illness or disability level;
once in an institution, the opportunities for transfer to another
nursing home are very limited.45
Market mechanisms for quality control work poorly for such patients; nursing home residents are rarely able to "vote with their
feet."
Have the regulations worked? The answer appears to be a
qualified "yes." In its 2001 report on long-term care, the IOM
concluded that the regulatory changes responding to its 1986 report have resulted in improvements in many areas, including the
overuse of restraints and psychoactive drugs and in the adoption
of "more consumer-centered approaches to care. "46 It cautioned, however, that improvements lagged in other areas, such
as the prevention of pressure sores, incontinence care, and assuring patient privacy. 47 Marshall Kapp considered these question in a recent article. Kapp surveyed the opinions of
regulators, health care providers, and advocates.48 From these
sources, he found general agreement that the regulatory structure flowing from the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 have
resulted in better patient care.49 Objective measurements also
seem to point to improvements in clinical care, survey and certification measures have facilitated improved quality assurance
procedures, and physicians are more involved in patient care
and institutional quality concerns. °
Significant problems remain. The IOM describes the three
central elements of the post-1987 federal regulatory structure as:
establishing quality and related standards for service
providers;
45. Id. at 5-6.
46. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM
47. Id.
48. Kapp, supra note 41 at 719-29.
49. Id. at 718-19.
50. Id.
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* designing survey processes and procedures to measure and
monitor actual conditions of residents or clients and to as*

sess compliance; and
specifying and 1 imposing remedies or sanctions for
noncompliance. 51

A recent report from the General Accounting Office suggests
that HHS and the states are failing in their execution of at least
a third of these factors.52 An examination of the regulatory
treatment of California nursing homes whose surveys revealed
substantial quality shortfalls established that regulators have
failed to impose sanctions, permit extensive grace periods for
remediation, forgive sanctions, and reinstate facilities terminated for quality reasons. 53 The report concluded that the laxness of the system for imposing sanctions on nursing homes has
given operators "little incentive to sustain compliance" with regulatory requirements. 4 The report's point is a common-sense
one: Regulatory standards are ineffective if the regulated community knows they will not be enforced.
Both the IOM (in its 2001 report) and Kapp point to means
other than command and control regulation for improving the
quality of nursing home care. The IOM points to the potential
benefits of an organized effort to enhance professional coordination of quality improvement efforts through methods similar
to those it proposed in its recent report on medical error. In
addition, the IOM reiterated a common-sense point first articulated in its 1986 study: Payment policy affects health care, and
HHS and the states should set reimbursement rates that permit
appropriate care to be provided to vulnerable nursing home
residents. 6
51. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM
in original).
52. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING

CARE,

supra note 6, at 137 (italics

OFFICE, CALIFORNIA NURSING
HOMES: CARE PROBLEMS PERSIST DESPITE FEDERAL AND STATES OVERSIGHT,

GAO/HEHS-98-202 (July 1998).
53. Id. at 22-28; See Comment, Angela Snellenberger Quin, Imposing Federal
Criminal Liability on Nursing Homes: A Way of Deterring Inadequate Health Care
and Improving the Quality of Care Delivered?, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 653, 667-69
(1999).
54. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 52, at 30.
55. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE, supra note 6, at 233-34 (proposing the establishment of Centers for the Advancement of Quality in Long-Term
Care). Compare To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 59 (recommending the creation
of a Center for Patient Safety).
56. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE, supra note 6 at 235-47.
Compare IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF NURSING HOMES, supra note 4, at 193-96.
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Kapp cautions against over-reliance on command and control
methods and advocates for consideration of other means of improving nursing home quality, including "market mechanisms,
professional education, different payment systems, private accreditation and privately initiated QA interventions. ' 57 An additional mechanism mentioned by Kapp that is consistent with
his advocacy of alternative regulatory mechanisms is the use of
ombudsman programs. 58 Long-term care ombudsman programs
have proven capable of allowing independent, well-informed
agents to act on behalf of patients who have limited direct ability to advocate for themselves.59
The vulnerability of nursing home patients dictates substantial
reliance on command and control regulation of quality. While
shifts in regulatory theory may push the discussion toward market-oriented mechanisms, a firm grounding of direct regulation
of the delivery of long term care continues to be essential.
B.

Managed Care Quality

Like the public concern for quality of care in nursing homes, a
concern over quality in managed care gathered in an increasing
stream of commentary. Beginning in the early 1980s, newspaper
accounts began to describe anecdotes of quality shortfalls - usually either the denial of necessary care or the provision of substandard care - allegedly attributable to the financing of
managed care.6 ° These newspaper accounts reflected a managed
care "backlash" deeply ingrained in public perception. Surveyed populations reported that they believed the "horror stories" to be "fairly common occurrences" for managed care plan
members. 61 A majority of respondents in a large survey believed that people covered by managed care "may not receive
the services they need when they are very sick," that people in
managed care have a harder time gaining access to specialists
when they are sick, and that "managed care has decreased the
62
quality of care."
The actual measure of quality in managed care is less certain.
Several analyses have found that the quality of care provided by
Kapp, supra note 41, at 716-17 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 723-24.
See IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE, supra note 6, at 174-176.
See Mark A. Peterson, Introduction:Politics, Misperception, or Apropos?, 24:5
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 873, 877-80 (1999); Jacobi, supra note 13, at 711-17.
61. Robert J. Blendon, et al., supra note 7, at 84.
62. Id.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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managed care organizations is no worse than that provided by
other financing systems.63 However, there is some evidence that
this is not the case for those managed care participants most in
need of care - those with chronic illness. 64 Adding to the uncertainty was the lack of confidence in plan performance measures
which one leading commentator described as "blunt, expensive,
incomplete and misleading. ' 65 Currently, much effort is being
expended to improve quality measurements in managed care,
but comprehensive objective measurements will be unpersuasive in the near term. Under conditions of evaluative uncertainty, consumer concerns about managed care are
understandable and rational.
The fee-for-service system famously incorporated incentives
to overuse resources, and in particular failed to provide incentives for the efficient use of resources. Increases in the absolute
cost of health care strongly suggested that some constraint was
necessary, and, in the absence of more comprehensive systemic
reform market-based managed care mechanisms presented
themselves as a ready and available option. Managed care partially reverses the incentives of health care providers, reducing
moral hazard in health expenditures and discouraging wasteful
spending.66 In the absence of reassuring objective evaluative
data, however, consumers are rationally concerned about quality of care. In the absence of either direct (command and control) or market-based (competition-enhancing) regulations,
providers have incentives to skimp on care and to shun patients
when they most need care. 67 But under conditions of evaluative
uncertainty, the law of unintended consequences looms, and
care must be taken not to do more harm than good.6 8
63. See Paul M. Ellwood, Jr. & George D. Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work in
Progress, 276 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1083 (1996); Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft,
Managed Care Plan Performance Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 1512 (1994).
64. See John M. Neff & Gerard Anderson, Protecting Children with Chronic Illness in a Competitive Marketplace, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1866 (1995); Sarah McCue
Horwitz & Ruth E. K. Stein, Health Maintenance Organizationsvs. Indemnity Insurance for Children with ChronicIllness, 144 AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILDREN 581 (1990).
65. David M. Eddy, Performance Measurement: Problems and Solutions, 17:4
HEALTH AFFAIRS 7, 16 (1998).
66. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance,30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311,
371-72 (1997).
67. See Thomas Rice, The Microregulationof the Health Care Marketplace, 24 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 967, 968 (1999).
68. See Alice A. Noble & Troyen A. Brennen, The Stages of Managed Care Regulation: Developing Better Rules, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 1275, 1275-1277 (1999).
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There has been no defining blockbuster study driving the regulation of managed care. Instead, legislators and regulators act
within a swirl of input, including self-interested and self-protected lobbying from providers, dramatic but isolated anecdotes
of harm resulting from managed care errors, and thoughtful
commentary from divergent expert sources. Unlike the regulatory response to nursing home quality failures, the response to
managed care concerns has not focused on command and control regulation, but has ranged across the spectrum of regulatory
tools. Several commentators have recognized a temporal progression in this regulation, as it has moved from disjointed and
reactive forms to more structural mechanisms.69 The regulatory
palate has, and will continue to have, a mix of forms incorporating both command and control and competition-enhancing
strategies.
Much of the regulatory response to managed care has been
motivated by a concern that cost containment efforts by managed care organizations ("MCOs") would result in the denial of
medically necessary, high-quality care. The need to address cost
pressures, particularly in the absence of health systems reform,
was appreciated by all. It was feared, however, that MCOs' financial incentives might lead to a cost/quality balance unacceptable to consumers or regulators. In short, the market for health
coverage was seen as sufficiently dysfunctional that intervention
was required. Imbalances in information, choice and power between consumers and MCOs were viewed as negating the possibility that quality could be preserved through private ordering.7 °
Initial efforts at managed care regulation were reactive to
anecdotes suggesting that MCOs imperiled consumers by denying access to specific services or providers. In response, states
specified the regulatory "rules of the game" in increasing but
uneven detail.71 State statutes and regulations set minimum
coverage for hospital procedures including labor and delivery
and mastectomies, mandate access to certain treatments and
providers, and set out rules governing coverage of emergency
69. See Richard Sorian & Judith Feder, Why We Need a Patients' Bill of Rights, 24
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 1137, 1139-43 (1999); Russell Korobkin, supra note 7,
at 7; Noble & Brennan, supra note 68, at 1281-95.
70. See Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 383 (1997).
71. See Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, The Managed Care Backlash and the
Task Force in California, 17:4 HEALTH AFFAIRS 95, 101 (1998).
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room visits. 72 These regulatory measures are similar to those
adopted in the nursing home context in one important sense:
they assumed that competition among plans would fail to produce the preferred or "correct" menu of services and providers
for MCO members, and that command and control regulation is
necessary to define the basic product.
A second type of managed care regulation is somewhat more
complex. These measures, sometimes scoffingly referred to as
"physician protection acts," limited the power of MCOs over
physicians. MCOs had developed a series of inducements and
punishments to reverse the perceived profligacy flowing from
the moral hazard inherent in the fee for service system. MCOs
provided monetary incentives for more cost effective practices,
and penalties for less cost effective practices, and exercised varying degrees of veto power over specific care choices. In addition, they employed the powerful tool of panel selection to
choose among physicians on the basis of their practices' compatibility with the MCOs' business plan. That is, MCOs retained
physicians practicing consistent with MCO standards and
"deselected" physicians who did not. As deselection excluded
physicians from the pool of the MCO's insureds, its threat could
be a powerful motivation.73
Physicians, of course, objected to this new and disturbing intrusion into their professional autonomy, and federal and state
regulators created a variety of responsive regulatory measures.
To varying degrees, regulators placed limits on physician incentives, created limited due process rights for physicians facing
deselection, and passed any willing provider rules. 74 These regulations have been dismissed as mere rent-seeking behavior on
the part of physicians, and there is power in this assertion.75 An
alternative explanation, however, is that consumers are hopelessly unable (due to information deficits, limited time and attention, and/or limitations on choice) to respond in the classic
market sense, and physicians (although self-interested as well)
serve as a roughly effective proxy. In any event, physicians appear to have gained little real power though these measures.
72. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 17-24; Sorian & Feder, supra note 7, at 1140;
Noble & Brennan, supra note 68, at 1283-85.
73. See Peter Kongstvedt, Compensation of Primary Care Physicians in Open
Panel Plans in ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED CARE 115 (2d ed. 1997).
74. See Noble & Brennan, supra, note 68, at 1285-86; Korobkin, supra note 7, at
16.
75. See Hyman, supra note 7, at 272-73.
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Other aspects of the regulatory response are intended to improve the function of the market rather than supplant it. These
regulations enhance a consumer's ability to use markets to improve quality both directly (by improving consumer access to
information) and indirectly (by enhancing private law contract
and tort remedies). They are premised on the belief that consumers' market power can enforce quality improvement, either
through "voting with their feet" or demanding changes in MCO
conduct, 76 if they are armed with better information on the relative merits of plans. These regulatory measures gather and distribute information that purports to describe plan quality
directly (through "report cards" based on process and patient
satisfaction surveys) and indirectly (through reporting modes of
operation such as physician compensation terms).77 However,
the questionable validity of the reported information, the limits
on consumers' ability to process the information, and consumers' limited ability to choose their MCO have cast some doubt
on the power of these regulations.78
All else being equal, efficient and effective markets contemplate the keeping of promises and the adherence of market participants to well-established societal norms. The market literally
disciplines participants to keep promises and meet background
expectations by disfavoring unreliable or unpredictable participants. Dispute resolution mechanisms play an important role in
markets by providing a trustworthy means of determining
whether a breach of faith or standards has occurred. Although
common law actions for fraud, breach of contract, and tort (including medical malpractice) have been available to members of
MCOs, the utilization of these mechanisms has been limited by
a judicial reluctance to recognize tort and quasi-contractual responsibilities of the plans. In addition, courts have interpreted
ERISA 79 as preempting large swaths of common law as applied
to the relationship between health insurers (including MCOs)
76.

See Marc A. Rodwin, Exit and Voice in American Health Care,32 U. MICH. J.

OF LAW REFORM 1041 (1999).

77. See Willam M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1701 (1999); Noble & Brennan, supra
note 68, at 1289; Regina E. Herzlinger, Finding "Truth" in Managed Care, 24 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 1077, 1081 (1999).
78. See Korobkin, supra note 7, at 50-56; Herzlinger, supra note 77, at 1081; Enthoven & Singer, supra note 71, at 102-03.
79. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et
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and insureds.8" While this reluctance has abated in recent
years, 81 legislators and regulators have nevertheless intervened
to ensure the availability of dispute resolution mechanisms to
members of MCOs. The two principle forms of regulation have
been: (1) legislative action to permit civil litigation against
MCOs for denial of medically appropriate care; and (2) the creation of administrative appeals to independent medical review
organizations, in order to challenge a denial of services.
The first of these process measures has been intended to open
traditional civil litigation remedies to MCO members, correcting
the limitations imposed by slow common law development and
ERISA preemption barriers. At least eight states have adopted
legislation permitting members to sue their MCO for a failure to
meet quality standards, and these standards are often borrowed
from tort law.82 A pioneering statute from Texas, for example,
permitted recovery against a health maintenance organization if
it "fail[ed] to use ordinary care when deciding whether to pay
for a medical procedure. ' 83 Pending federal legislation would
similarly permit tort litigation against a managed care organization if it failed to use ordinary care in denying coverage for services and if such denial caused injury to a member.84 In brief,
this enacted and pending legislation extends members' rights to
enforce contractual and common law quality and access rights
against plans. The state statutes attempt to avoid ERISA preemption by defining the new rights as the regulation of insur-

80. See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function and Managed Care
Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence,35 HOUSTON L. REV.
(1998); Karen Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm:Conceptualand Interpretive
Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149 (1998); Karen Jordan, Travelers Insurance: New Supportfor the Argument to Restrain ERISA Preemption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255 (1996).
81. See In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999) (recognizing the
diminishing sweep of ERISA preemption in tort actions against MCOs); Barry R.
Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31
GEORGIA L. REV. 419 (1997) (describing broader recognition of common law actions
against MCOs).
82. See Patricia Butler, Key Characteristicsof State Managed Care Organization
Liability Laws: Current Status and Experience, Kaiser Family Foundation (Aug. 2001)
at http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3155/MCO (last visited October 16, 2001); Nancy
R. Mansfield et al., Evolving Tension Between HMO Liability Precedent and Legislation, 36 TORT & INS. L. J. 949, 957-60 (2001).
83. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 88.001 et seq.
84. See S. 1053, 107th Cong., § 402 (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th Cong., § 402 (2001).
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ance, 85 and the proposed federal legislation simply aims to
amend ERISA in order to permit the new remedies.86

The second process measure, the creation of a right of appeal
to an independent medical organization, has now been adopted
by a majority of states and is included in the pending federal

legislation.87 This process is less formal than civil litigation, and

is therefore easier for a plan member to employ. It usually permits review of decisions to deny coverage, and in some jurisdictions extends to quality of care complaints. 88 Like civil
litigation, the independent review provisions provide a formal

mechanism for the disclosure of information on coverage, exposes decision-making within plans to public scrutiny, and
designates a forum for enforcing the bargain embodied in the
insurance contract.89

A couple of caveats. First, in some respects, discussion of
these process measures is a bit far afield in the context of health
care "quality," as many of the disputes concern payment for
care, and not the quality of care. The procedures do, however,
contemplate resolution of some quality disputes. Second, there
is vigorous debate over the extent to which process measures,
including medical malpractice actions, actually affect health care
quality. 90 Imperfect though it may be, however, medical mal-

practice litigation (and by natural implication any administrative
mechanism that mimics it) provides some measure of deterrence, thereby inclining future health care providers to avoid in85. See Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance, 215
F.3d 526 rehearing and rehearing en banc denied; 220 F.3d 641 (5th Cir.) petition for
cert. filed 69 USLW 3317 (October 24, 2000); Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, 230
F.3d 959 (7" h Cir. 2000) cert. granted 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001).
86. See S. 1053, 107' Cong., § 402 (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th Cong., § 402 (2001).
87. See Butler, supra note 82, at 2 ("Over three-quarters of states now require
'external' review under which MCO enrollees can appeal a denial of coverage on
grounds of medical necessity (or sometimes other grounds) to an organization outside
of the MCO . . ."); Shirley Eiko Sanematsu, Taking a Broader View of Treatment
Disputes Beyond Managed Care: Are Recent Legislative Efforts the Cure?, 48
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1260 (2001) ("As of March 2000, thirty-two states had some
form of an [independent medical review] procedure mandated in state law."); S. 1052,
§ 104; H.R. 2563, § 104.
88. See CorporateHealth Insurance, 215 F.3d at 536-39 (discussing the Texas statute); Moran, 230 F.3d at 966-97 (discussing Illinois statute); Sanematsu, supra note 87,
at 1263-1271 (discussing California statute).
89. See Sanematsu, supra note 87, at 1268 (describing California statute).
90. See, e.g., PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985); PAUL WEILER et al., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL
(1991); PAUL WEILER et al., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993).
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jurious conduct. 91 This deterrence effect is achieved by
increasing the level of information available in the marketplace
about the quality of care and about the meaning of contract and
tort terms imposing liability when quality lags. Certainly health
care providers are better able to arm themselves with information in order to conform their conduct to quality norms; 92 in theory, at least, consumers could also learn about the quality
judgments of these tribunals. The process remedies in managed
care regulation, then, bolster private ordering arrangements for
health quality and improve the distribution of quality
information.
The response to nursing home concerns concentrated on command and control regulation, apparently because nursing home
residents and their families were seen as having sharply limited
ability to obtain and understand quality information, and as having little or no meaningful choice even if they were armed with
excellent information. In contrast, the regulatory response to
quality concerns in managed care have been varied. Indeed, it is
artificial to suggest that a coherent legislative intent unifies the
field. 93 Instead, it seems that a variety of regulations have responded to a variety of concerns. As is true with nursing homes,
there is concern that consumers will not have access to quality
information that either accurately captures the distinctions
among plans or is readily intelligible, and that consumer choice
of plans is quite limited. These observations about managed
care, as with nursing homes, inclines government to supplant
markets and impose command and control regulations on plans.
On the other hand, much regulatory attention has been paid to
gathering and distributing information as though consumers can
process the information and make real choices.
The explanation for this divergence may be that compared to
nursing home patients, a larger percentage of managed care
consumers can process the information, while also having some
measure of freedom to make choices. Some consumers are em91. See Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort
Law Really Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. LAW REV. 377, 443 (1994); RICHARD POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 222-24 ( 5th Ed. 1998); WEILER et al. supra note 90, at
131; DANZON, supra note 90, at 226.

92. See John V. Jacobi & Nicole Huberfeld, Quality Control, Enterprise Liability
and Disintermediationin Managed Care, 29 J. LAW, MED. & ETHICS 305, 308 (2001).
93. See Donald W. Moran, Federal Regulation of Managed Care: An Impulse in
Search of a Theory?, 16:6 HEALTH AFFAIRS 7, 20 (1997) ( suggesting that the array of
regulatory models does not "match up well against the essence of the problem that
any meaningful policy needs to address.").
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ployers or HR directors who choose for a group; some are members of state employee purchasing systems who are permitted
very wide choice; and some participate in either public (Medicare or Medicaid) or private markets for individual coverage.9 4
As Regina Herzlinger has pointed out, "[t]he fundamental lesson of Economics 101 is that [market] equilibrium is determined
by marginal participants, not the average ones." 95 If some managed care consumers are able and motivated, their activities may
complement the command and control regulation; the marketenabling regulations producing consumer information may foster that ability and motivation. Further, the participants in independent medical reviews and civil litigation may be among the
able and motivated marginal group, and regulations fostering
this quasi-private dispute resolution may affect the quality equilibrium as well. The disparate nature of the regulation of managed care, therefore, may simply reflect the mixed nature of the
problem. To some extent regulators have concluded that markets fail; they therefore direct plans with respect to certain minimum quality indicators such as plan design and terms of
participation. To some extent, however, the market, suitably
supplemented by regulation, may produce quality improvement
even without more direct government involvement.
III.

REGULATING MEDICAL ERROR:
ENFORCING COMPETITION

Today, government is faced with a new health quality concern.
The concerns raised in the IOM's 1986 report on nursing homes
are in some ways similar to those raised by its recent report on
medical error. The former reported nursing home patients who
"receive very inadequate - sometimes shockingly deficient care that is likely to hasten the deterioration of their physical,
mental and emotional health. '9 6 The new report estimates that
up to 98,000 hospital patients per year die from medical error
and suggests that hospital-based injuries may be only the tip of
the iceberg, "since hospital patients represent only a small portion of the total population at risk," as many people receive "increasingly complex" care in settings other than hospitals. 9 The
94.

See Jacobi, supra note 13, at 784-85.

95.
96.

Herzlinger, supra note 77, at 1079.

97.

To

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES,

ERR IS HUMAN,
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IOM's recommended response to the nursing home crisis was
heavily regulatory:
A freer market was not considered by the committee to be a
serious alternative to more effective government regulation .... Regulation is essential to protect these vulnerable
consumers. Although regulation alone is not sufficient to
achieve high-quality care, easing or relaxing regulation is inappropriate under current circumstances.98
Similarly, the 1999 report also highlighted a basic regulatory
response:
The committee believes that a basic level of safety should be
assured for all who use the health system and a strong regulatory component is critical to accomplishing this goal. In most
industries, safety is a traditional role of public policy, enforced
through regulation. A regulatory authority generally defines
minimum levels of capability or expected performance.
Through some type of monitoring mechanism ...problems
can be identified and corrective action taken to maintain the
minimum levels of performance. 99
The IOM,then, recommended command and control standard
setting and monitoring regulations similar to those applicable to
nursing homes. But its recommendations on how to address the
problem of medical error were broader. The committee advocated a mixture of responses in addition to the regulatory suggestions, encouraging the employment of economic and
professional incentives. 100 Two questions then arise in connection with the 1999 IOM report: What types of regulatory responses are available in this setting, and, of that assortment of
responses, which can best facilitate the "[c]areful alignment of
regulatory, economic, professional and other incentives [necessary] if significant improvements in safety are to occur"?101 Preliminarily, it is useful to survey the steps government has taken
thus far in reaction to the problem.
One of the IOM's principle recommendations called for the
creation of a federal Center For Patient Safety to serve as a hub
of research into measures necessary to achieve a "50% reduction in errors over five years." 102 Shortly after the report's re98.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES,
ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 18.

supra note 4, at 4-6.

99. To
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 60.
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lease, the Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety
was funded within the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality. 103 Shortly after the 2000 elections, the Bush administration formed an interagency Patient Safety Task Force, with
the IOM's goal of "reducing the number for medical errors by
50 percent over 5 years."'" More recently, HHS has announced
the award of $50 million (described as "the first phase of a
multi-year effort") to researchers engaged in the enterprise set
out by the IOM. 0 5 The grantees fell into six categories, including those investigating reporting of medical error data, studying
the use of computers and other "innovative approaches" to improve patient safety, and examining the relationship between
working conditions and patient error.' °6 The projects are intended to:
address key unanswered questions about how errors occur and

provide science-based information on what patients, clinicians,
hospital leaders, policymakers and others can do to make the
health care system safer. The results of this research will iden-

tify improvement strategies that work in hospitals, doctors' offices, nursing
homes and other health care settings across the
07
nation.1

These efforts to advance the research into the rate, cause, and
means of prevention of medical error appear to comprise the
regulatory response to the IOM report to date. Should there be
more?
One way of answering this question is to consult history by
examining the health and safety concerns and regulatory responses associated with the nursing home and managed care
"crises" described above for guidance. 10 8 That is, assuming that
103. See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Clinton-GoreAdministration Announces New Actions to Improve PatientSafety and Assure Health Care Quality, at http://www.ahcpr.gov/wh21900.htm (Feb. 19, 2000).
104. See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Patient Safety Task Force:
Fact Sheet, at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/taskforce/psfactst.htm (Apr. 2001).
105. See U.S. Dep't Health & Human Serv., Press Release: HHS Announces $50
Million Investment to Improve Patient Safety, at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2001pres/20011011.html (Oct. 12, 2001) [hereinafter "HHS Press Release"].
106. See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Brief List of PatientSafety
Awards, at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/newgrants/granttbl.htm (Oct. 2001).
107. HHS Press Release, supra note 105.
108. There are, of course, other ways to answer this question. Formal and extensive examinations of regulatory theory in general and as applied to the health care
delivery system are available. See, e.g., BRENNAN & BERWICK, supra note 24; JOST,
supra note 25; SUNSTEIN, supra note 25; BREYER, supra note 25. As is described
above, the goal in this essay is to compare the treatment of two prior instances of
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the research efforts described in the 1999 IOM report on medical error bear fruit, and the IOM's dream of at least some level
of acceptance of systemic, process-oriented correctives to the
circumstances causing medical error are developed, can regulatory response be guided by the experience with previous health
quality regulatory responses? Drawing from the nursing home
and managed care cases, a variety of regulatory responses are
possible, both those that are intended to protect consumers
through command and control regulation in the absence of market mechanisms on which they can rely, and those that facilitate
or enhance market mechanisms for consumer protection.
In the command and control category, regulatory responses
may include requiring licensure, certification, and certificates of
need. All would serve a similar role here: if one assumes that
some objectively valid steps for the amelioration of risks of
medical error are developed, command and control regulation
could ensure that these steps are taken by health care providers.
Suppose, as is likely, that the research now being undertaken10 9
establishes that computerized drug prescription and/or administration systems can significantly reduce the risk of human error
in drug administration at a reasonable cost. 110 Traditional command and control regulation can induce reluctant providers to
adopt these promising new methods. The mechanism for this
inducement is similar. Licensure requirements could mandate
the consideration and/or adoption of the new quality control
methods, much as nursing home licensure now requires the implementation of some process for error analysis and continuous
quality improvement.11 ' Certification programs, by which regulators adopt the assessment of trusted independent surveyors on
quality assurance,"' could include as a measure of compliance
the surveyed institution's adoption of the quality tool. And certification of need programs could select among providers on the
basis of their adoption of quality tools, and condition the award
health care quality concern with that presented by the 1999 IOM report, and suggest
an inference from the respective regulatory responses.
109. HHS Press Release, supra note 105, identifying $5.3 million in funding for
research on the "use of computers and information technology to reduce medical errors, improve patient safety, and improve quality of care."
110. CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 14, at 162-63 (describing extensive positive research on the use of software to prevent drug error).
111. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LONG-TERM CARE, supra note 6, at 220-34.
112. See BRENNEN & BERWICK, supra note 24, at 159-62 (describing the certification function of the National Committee on Quality Assurance in the managed care
arena).
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of a certificate on their
maintenance of up to date methods of
113
reducing drug error.
Market-oriented regulatory mechanisms are, of course, premised on a different mechanism for quality assurance. These
mechanisms assume some viable market in health care services,
and attempt to facilitate informed choice by consumers and
their proxies, so that "good" products succeed and "bad" products fail. Regulators intervene in markets to increase the possibility that choice is available, informed and effective in selecting
as among competitors.
For example, antitrust law seeks to protect competition,
thereby permitting actual choice to drive the market. At some
point in the aggregation of market power, an entity or combination of entities may become practically immune to market pressure through the elimination of meaningful competitors. In
recent years, a consolidation movement has increased the size of
health care institutions, and has tended to reduce the number of
competitors. 4 Consolidation and cooperation among competitors is often seen as harmful to competition, and therefore to
consumers. In the health care industry, however, such consolidation and cooperation is often asserted to be advantageous to
consumers, as peculiarities in the health care market allegedly
limit the price effects of such cooperation, and as consolidation
and cooperation are sometimes seen as enhancing the quality of
care. Both of these assertions are contested, but do render complex any assertion that aggregation of market share is contrary
15
to consumer interests.1
Frustration of competition is one means by which markets
could be rendered ineffective in ensuring quality in health care.
Unremedied fraud is another. In nearly perfect markets, the
failure of a health care provider to provide services at the quality level explicitly or implicitly promised would cause competitive disadvantages for that provider, and the market would
discipline it away from that behavior. The health care market is
113. See Robert B. Hackey, Commentary, New Wine in Old Bottles: Certificate of
Need Enters the 1990s, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 927, 929-30 (1993).
114. See John K. Inglehart, Interview, the Federal Trade Commission in Action:
The FTC's Robert F Leibenluft, 17:5 HEALTH AFFAIRS 65 (1998); Peter J. Hammer,
Questioning TraditionalAntitrust Presumptions: Price and Non-Price Competition in
Hospital Markets, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 727 (1999).
115. See Hammer, supra note 114; William M. Sage, Judge Posner'sRFP: Antitrust
Law and Managed Care, 16:6 HEALTH AFFAIRS 44 (1997); Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market FailureDefenses in Antitrust Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN.
L. REv. 605 (1989).
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famously imperfect, however; information flow is bad and its
comprehensibility even worse.116 Common law fraud is the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact that is intended to
and does cause a person to reasonably rely to his detriment, resulting in damages. 7 Statutory versions of fraud, in particular
the False Claims Act,1 18 embody similar elements, and have to a
large degree replaced common law fraud in the health care
arena. In recent years, health care providers who injure patients
by falling below accepted quality standards are sometimes taken
to task through the mechanism of fraud actions.11 9 The pursuit
of actionable misrepresentations has the potential benefit of
both increasing the information available to consumers (through
publicity surrounding the action) and disciplining market participants to say what they mean and do what they say.
Finally, regulation that disseminates (or requires the dissemination of) information could assist consumers and their proxies
in understanding which health care providers have progressively
adopted emerging error reduction technologies. Borrowing
from the managed care regulations described above, government could directly or indirectly cause adoption of such measures and the publication of the results in order to facilitate
informed choice based on quality. As outcomes research proceeds, it may one day be bundled with this process information
to permit consumers and their proxies to review both the means
by which providers seek to avoid error, and their rate of success
in that endeavor.
Private law, in the form of medical malpractice litigation, will
undoubtedly affect the development of discipline such that it
complies with sound quality-control mechanisms within the
health care industry.12 0 In this sense, it will be arguably adjunctive to the actions that may pursued under the False Claims Act
116.
117.
118.

See Korobkin, supra note 7.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1345-46 (2000).
31 U.S.C. § 3729. See TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON DAVIES, MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 66-80 (2001-02 ed.).
119. See Joan H. Krause, Medical Error as False Claim, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 181
(2001); John R. Munich & Elizabeth W. Lane, When Neglect Becomes Fraud: Quality
of Care and False Claims, 43 ST. Louis L. REV. 27 (1999); Robert Fabrikant & Glenn
E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance
Issues in the Health Care Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105 (1999); Sharon L. Davies &
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Managed Care: Placebo or Wonder Drug for Health Care
Fraud and Abuse?, 31 GEORGIA L. REV. 373 (1997).
120. See William Sage, Principles, Pragmatism and Medical Injury, 286 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 226 (2001).
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(or is it the other way around?). In any event, purely private
medical malpractice law is beyond the scope of this essay.

Assuming that the development of systemic error reduction
follows the infusion of research funding that followed the IOM

report, both non-market (command and control) and marketoriented regulatory interventions are supported by history. Will
the application of these tools be necessary to reduce error?

Only two arguments would support a negative answer. First, it
could be argued that the professionalism of health care providers is a force of sufficient strength so that the error-reduction
mechanism will be adopted upon production without any
outside urging. Second, it could be argued that the free market,
unfettered by government, will naturally favor providers adopting such mechanisms, and will therefore provide incentives suffi-

cient to do the job. Neither of these arguments is persuasive.
The nursing home quality problems have demonstrated that
shortfalls in professional practice do not arise only when technical information on quality is lacking. 121 Rather, quality suffers
even in the presence of adequate understanding of error-reduction methods when poor care is to the economic advantage of
health care providers, and when outside regulators fail to intervene. Moreover, the managed care quality problems of more
recent vintage suggest that market forces alone are inadequate
to ensure quality, for reasons including imperfections in health
care markets and cognitive limits on market participants' ability
122
to gather and process information.
Some regulation, therefore, will be necessary to ensure the
implementation of systemic error-reduction mechanisms that
will flow from ongoing research efforts. History suggests two
constraints on that regulatory impulse. First, government is a
flawed micro-manager of health systems, and command and
control regulation is therefore proper only in limited circumstances in the health care setting. Second, markets have the
power to regulate well when nearly perfect, but can readily fail
when imbalances of information, choice, and power go unremedied. These constraints suggest two appropriate categories
of regulation.
Command and control regulation should set and enforce a
threshold level of adoption of error-reduction technologies.
121.
2-7.
122.

See
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Through licensure and certification standards, regulators can
mandate that providers participate in the implementation of error-reduction technologies as they emerge, as regulators now
mandate a process of continuous quality improvement. This requirement would be a process requirement only, mandating the
formal consideration of the developing error-reduction field unless and until a set of technologies reaches the status of state of
the art. Surveying against licensure and certification would ascertain the degree to which providers meaningfully consider and
selectively adopt appropriate methods. More intrusive command and control regulation seems unwise; innovation is hoped
to flow continually from the ongoing research, and the actual
selection of error-reduction methods by regulators is sure to suffer from time-lag and other problems.
In light of the inappropriateness of direct command and control regulation in this area, the role of competition-enhancing
regulation rises. As described above, the market is not likely to
operate sufficiently well to maximize the adoption of new errorreduction technologies. In such circumstances, market-enhancing regulations can complement limited command and control
regulation by correcting market imperfections traceable to imbalances in information, choice, and power. The least intrusive
and most clearly appropriate mechanism would be the facilitation of the gathering and distribution of information on market
participants' adoption of error-reduction methods, thereby facilitating choice. Choice is possible, however, only where competition exists, and anti-trust enforcement, even in the face of claims
that consolidation benefits consumers, is therefore essential.
Furthermore, choice is meaningful only if market participants
are not permitted to short-circuit the process by defrauding consumers and their proxies by promising quality services in the absence of meaningful error-reduction efforts. Fraud enforcement
provides discipline for accurate information flow.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The intensive research now being undertaken into the causes
of medical error will bear fruit, most likely in the form of systems-based protocols, to correct the human tendency to error.
These protocols are not likely to permeate the health care delivery system unaided by government. Both professional aspirations to excellence and market pressures toward efficiency have
been inadequate in past quality crises and will not correct the
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol11/iss1/5
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problem unaided. Instead, government regulation is called for
now, as it was called for then.
Two factors should limit the move to regulation. First, the
complexity of the causes of error in health care delivery does
not lend itself to comprehensive command and control regulation. Second, the somewhat plodding nature of regulatory reaction meshes poorly with the rapid pace of innovation anticipated
in this area. Regulation therefore should be limited in scope but
substantial where applied. Command and control regulation of
providers should be limited to ensuring their participation in the
process of reviewing and selectively adopting novel methods of
improving quality. The balance of the regulatory effort should
be devoted to enhancing market forces, which more quickly and
responsively may encourage adoption of new technologies.
These market-enhancing regulations should be of three types.
First, information on adoption of, and, where possible, success
with new methods of error reduction on the part of providers
should be gathered and made available to consumers and their
proxies. Second, antitrust limits on consolidation and cooperation should be enforced, even in the face of assertions that largescale cooperative behavior facilitates error-reduction. The
power of competition to encourage and maintain quality assurance methods is sufficiently significant to cause regulators to eye
warily claims of consumer benefits in monopoly. Third, fraud
actions should be employed to identify those who subvert the
competitive system with misinformation, thereby frustrating attempts to employ informed choice to ensure quality. Information flows too poorly in the health care marketplace to expect
frauds and cheats to be exposed without governmental
oversight.
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